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ON DEJUDICIALIZING AMERICAN CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW
Richard Briffault
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court dominates American campaign finance law.
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission' dramatically
illustrates this basic truth, but Citizens United is nothing new. The
Court has been the preeminent force in shaping and constraining our
campaign finance laws since Buckley v. Valeo, 2 and the Court's role
as arbiter of what regulations may or may not be enforced only
continues to grow. The President of the United States can wag his
finger at the Court during the State of the Union Address and
denounce its Citizens United ruling to the Justices' faces on national
television, 3 but even he does not propose to challenge the Court's
decision. Instead, the President proposes only to regulate in those
areas where the Court indicated some regulation is still permissible.
According to public opinion polls, as much as two-thirds 4 of the
population opposes the Court's holding that corporations and unions
have an unlimited right to spend money in elections. But the public
is, in practice, powerless to have the law changed.
The central features of American campaign finance law are the
product of the Court's actions and opinions. Unlike many other
Western democracies, which impose monetary limits on campaign
1. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976).
3. 2010 State of the Union Address, http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/2010-barack-obama ("Last
week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for special interests including foreign corporations - to spend without limit in our elections. Well I don't think American
elections should be bankrolled by America's most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They
should be decided by the American people, and that's why I'm urging Democrats and Republicans to
pass a bill that helps to right this wrong.").
4. See, e.g, The Pew Research Center, "Obama's Ratings Are Flat, Wall Street's Are Abysmal:
Midterm Election Challenges for Both Parties" (Feb. 12, 2010) at 5, 30-31 (finding that 17% of those
surveyed approved of the decision versus 68% disapproved); Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research,
Strong Campaign Finance Reform: Good Policy, Good Politics (Feb. 8, 2010) (finding 27% supported
the decision versus 64% opposed, with 47% strongly opposed).
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spending, the United States does not do so because the Court has said
that is unconstitutional. In so doing, the Court has sustained the
ability of wealthy candidates to convert their personal resources to
campaign uses without constraint and has also upheld the ability of
independent organizations and groups to spend without limit to
influence election outcomes. Similarly, the Court has decided what
political activity can be deemed election-related, and thus regulated
by campaign finance law, and what political activity must be treated
as beyond the scope of campaign regulation, even if that activity
plainly has direct implications for political campaigns. So, too, the
Court has defined-narrowly-the permissible purposes of campaign
finance regulation. In so doing, it has rejected as a legitimate
regulatory purpose-accepted by many other Western democraciesthe promotion of political equality. To be sure, the campaign finance
laws that we have are the ones that are adopted by our elected
representatives in Congress or state and local legislatures, or by the
people, or acting through state or local voter initiatives. But the Court
has consistently-and, particularly in the last few years,
aggressively-had the last word in deciding which laws may be
allowed to take effect.
Court determination of campaign finance law might not be a bad
thing if the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence were stable,
coherent, workable, and closely tied to the text and values of the
Constitution. Unfortunately, our Court-determined campaign finance
law is none of these things. As Citizens United's overturning of
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce5 and the electioneering
communication portion of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission6 demonstrates, the Court's jurisprudence has hardly been
a model of stability. Nor are the results particularly coherent. For the
two decades between Austin and Citizens United, the jurisprudence
governing corporate and union election spending barred restrictions
on spending in ballot proposition elections but, oddly, permitted
spending prohibitions in candidate elections. Citizens United
5. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
6. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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eliminated that anomalous distinction by rejecting the idea that the
corporate form poses any special dangers that justify special
restrictions. But Citizens United left in place-at least for now-laws
completely barring corporations and unions from making
contributions to candidates and parties. Banning corporate
contributions seems at odds with Citizens United's view that
corporations do not present special dangers justifying especially
restrictive regulation, while the radical difference in the treatment of
corporate contributions and expenditures seems doctrinally
*7
*
inconsistent.
The two central doctrinal distinctions in the Court's campaign
finance law-between contributions and expenditures and between
express advocacy and issue advocacy-have been especially
problematic. The very sharp difference in the treatment of
contribution and expenditure restrictions has been fundamental to
campaign finance doctrine since Buckley v. Valeo, yet that distinction
has proven difficult to justify in theory or apply in practice. Although
there is greater theoretical justification for some distinction to mark
the boundaries of campaign finance regulation, the specific line
drawn by the Court is, as the Court has itself acknowledged,
"functionally meaningless." 8 For a few brief years the Court accepted
of "electioneering
definition
Congress's more workable
communication," but then in Federal Election Commission v.
7. As this article was going to press, two federal courts issued conflicting decisions concerning the
impact of Citizens United on the longstanding federal and state laws prohibiting corporate contributions
2011 WL
to candidates. In Minnesota Citizens Concernedfor Life, Inc. v Swanson, _ F.3d _,
18331236 (8th Cir., May 16, 2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that
Citizens United did not call into question the constitutionality of a Minnesota law prohibiting corporate
contributions to candidates and political parties in state elections. In United States v. Danielczyk,
however, the federal district court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the federal ban on
1:11 -cr-00085-JCC (E.D. Va., May 26,
corporate contributions is unconstitutional. _ F. Supp.2d -,
2011). While the Eighth Circuit emphasized Citizens United's invocation of the contribution/expenditure
distinction, the district court found the "logic" of Citizens United to be "inescapable.... [F]or better or
for worse, Citizens United held that there is no distinction between an individual and a corporation with
respect to political speech. Thus, if an individual can make direct contributions ... a corporation cannot
be banned from doing the same thing." Id. at 44-46. However, five days later, on May 31, 2011, the
district court invited the parties to brief whether the court should reconsider its May 26th order in light
of the pre-Citizens United Supreme Court precedent specifically upholding the ban on corporate
contributions. As a result, as of this writing, the ultimate decision in Danielczyk is uncertain. More
generally, whatever clarity Citizens United brought to the constitutionality of corporate spending, the
constitutionality of the regulation of corporate contributions remains unresolved.
8. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 193.
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Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.,9 it limited Congress's new measure to
the "functional equivalent of express advocacy" which is both vaguer
than the old "express advocacy" standard yet still functionally
meaningless. The combination of instability, internal inconsistency,
and practical unworkability might be acceptable if the Court's
doctrine were rooted in the text or values of the Constitution. But it is
not. It is too late in the day to deny that campaign finance laws
implicate the First Amendment freedom of speech and association,
and the broader constitutional interest in political participation.
Money may not be speech, but raising and spending money is
essential to the dissemination of campaign communications, bringing
facts and arguments to the electorate, and informing the voters. The
central constitutional question in campaign finance law is what public
interests justify restrictions, requirements, or prohibitions affecting
the use of campaign money. The Court has taken a very narrow
approach to the justifications for regulation, limiting campaign
finance law to the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption, and voter information. Any concern for political
equality-for limiting the ability of the wealthy to deploy their
financial advantage in the political arena-has been ruled out. Not
only may equality not be pursued by limits on spending, but, in Davis
v. Federal Election Commission,10 the Court held it is
unconstitutional for Congress to try to make it easier for non-wealthy
candidates to raise money to campaign against wealthy self-funded
opponents, even though the law in question imposed no limits on the
ability of the wealthy to use their money. Moreover, in Citizens
United the Court shifted away from McConnell's willingness to find
that "corruption" may include the efforts of individuals and interest
groups to use campaign money to obtain special access to
government decision-makers," and instead embraced the more
crabbed view, specifically rejected in McConnell, that only campaign
practices that resemble bribery-and not the broader use of campaign

9. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
10. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
11. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143-54.
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money to influence government behavior-can

be treated as

2011]

corruption.12
Nothing in the Constitution dictates either Davis's exclusion of
equality concerns or Citizens United's narrow definition of
corruption. Indeed, the Court has recognized in other settings that
political equality is a central value in election law, with strong
consequences for both the scope of the right to vote and legislative
representation, and recent scholarship has demonstrated a broad
concern with corruption, not limited to bribes and near-bribes,
immanent throughout the Constitution.13 The Court's limited
definition of the values justifying campaign finance restrictions
reflect the values of its members-values that can shift with changes
in the composition of the Court, much as the tenor of the Court's
campaign finance rulings changed with the replacement of Justice
O'Connor by Justice Alito-not anything specific in the text or
values of the Constitution.
In this Article, I will suggest that campaign finance law ought to
be, to a considerable degree, dejudicialized. That is, the Court should
take a reduced role and be more deferential to the decisions of elected
representatives or of the people themselves. This does not mean
judicial abandonment of the field. The Court still needs to play a role
in policing against laws that would discriminate against minorities
and political outsiders or that would entrench incumbent
officeholders or parties. But short of these extreme cases, the Court
should let the democratic process play the leading role in determining
how democratic elections ought to be financed, and what campaign
finance practices ought to be regulated or restricted. The case for this
change is based on the failure of the Court to develop a coherent and
workable body of doctrine, the lack of a clear constitutional basis for
the aggressive and constraining role the Court has taken, and the
democratic legitimacy that would result if these decisions were taken
primarily by politically accountable decision-makers.

12. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909-11 (2010).
13. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle,94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009).
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In Part I, I will review some of the "internal" problems with the
Court's campaign finance doctrine-its inconsistencies and
theoretical and practical difficulties. This Part will address
the Court's treatment of corporations, the
specifically
contribution/expenditure distinction, and the scope of election-related
activity that may be subject to campaign finance regulation. In Part
II, I will consider how the Court has constrained the justifications for
campaign finance regulation by rejecting or ignoring many of the
legitimate political concerns underlying the laws enacted by elected
representatives or adopted by popular initiative. Campaign finance
implicates multiple constitutional values, but the Court has chosen to
recognize just a few. That narrowing action, however, is not rooted in
the Constitution itself but reflects the decision of the members of the
Court to prefer certain values to others. This is ultimately a political
judgment that certain values matter more than others in the financing
of campaigns, but in making such a political judgment, not clearly
rooted in the Constitution, the Court ought to give greater weight to
the enactments of politically accountable elected representatives and
of the voters who adopt ballot measures. Finally, in Part III, I will
indicate that aggressive judicial policing of campaign finance law is
not justified by the concern that incumbents will use campaign
finance regulation to entrench themselves in office. I will then sketch
out, with reference to some of the Court's other election law
doctrines, how a more dejudicialized campaign finance law with a
Court more deferential to the decisions of elected representatives and
to the electorate might work.

I. THE COURT'S DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES
A. Corporations
Among the key goals of legal doctrine are internal consistency and
temporal stability. By that measure, the Court's campaign finance
doctrine has long been a failure. For many years, the Court's
approach to the law governing corporate participation in financing
election campaigns was the poster child for the anomalies and
doctrinal zigzags that are the hallmarks of the Court's campaign
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finance jurisprudence. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellottil4
in 1978, the Court struck down a Massachusetts law forbidding
corporations from spending to influence the vote in ballot proposition
elections. Bellotti emphasized the "inherent worth of the [corporate]
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public,"' 5 and denied
that "the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to
protection."l 6 Bellotti was closely in tune with Buckley and seemed to
foreshadow judicial rejection of the special restrictions governing
corporate electoral activity that have long been a central feature of
American campaign finance law and that antedated Buckley's
reformulation of campaign finance doctrine by decades.
Yet, applying Buckley to corporations proved to be far from a
simple matter. Just four years after Bellotti, in Federal Election
Commission v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC),' 7 the
Court upheld a federal law that tightly restricted the ability of a
nonprofit ideological corporation to solicit donations to its political
action committee (PAC). The Court found that the government's
interest in "ensur[ing] that substantial aggregations of wealth
amassed by the special advantages which go with the corporate form
of organization should not be converted into political 'war chests"'
justified the restriction.' 8 In other words, despite Bellotti's "speech is
speech" approach, in NR WC the corporate form mattered, even when
the corporation in question was not a business corporation but a
nonprofit. Four years after that, in Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),19 the Court expanded
on NWRC's finding that the corporate form provides a special
justification for regulation-that "concern over the corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the conviction that
it is important to protect the integrity of the marketplace of political

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id. at 777.
Id. at 778.
FEC v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
Id. at 207.
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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ideas." 20 But this time, unlike in NRWC, the Court determined that
the nonprofit nature of the corporation mattered. With campaign
spending by a nonprofit, the "prospect that resources amassed in the
economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace" 2 1 did not arise. As a result, limitations on
corporate spending could not constitutionally be applied to a
nonprofit even though it was organized in the corporate form.
Four years after that, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,22 the Court upheld a Michigan law prohibiting
corporations from spending money to support or oppose candidates in
state elections. Again, the Court emphasized the special nature of the
corporate form-"the unique state-conferred corporate structure that
facilitates the amassing of large treasuries."2 3 The Court
distinguished Bellotti as a ballot propositions case, implying that
corporate status mattered in candidate elections even if it did not
matter in voter initiative elections. In 2003, the Court twice upheld
special restrictions on corporations: In FederalElection Commission
v. Beaumont, it sustained the application of the federal ban on
corporate campaign contributions to nonprofit corporations,24 and in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, it rejected a facial
challenge to the provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
("BCRA") of 2002 extending the prohibition of corporate
independent spending to corporate electioneering communications.2 5
Of course, in 2010, in Citizens United the Court returned to
Bellotti's position that "speech is speech" and that the corporate form
is irrelevant to the constitutionality of limits on corporate spending.
Citizens United invalidated bans on corporate campaign expenditures,
and overturned both Austin and the relevant portion of McConnell.26
Citizens United has the benefit of simplifying the law by eliminating
the arbitrary and unpersuasive candidate election/ballot proposition
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 257.
Id.
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
Id. at 660.
FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003).
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
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election distinction. So, too, by going directly to the question of
whether corporate campaign spending may be barred, the Court also
eliminated MCFL's special carve-out for nonprofit corporations from
the campaign spending ban and with it the difficulty of drawing the
line between business and nonprofit corporations in cases, such as
Citizens United itself, in which a nonprofit organization accepted
some business corporation contributions.
Yet even after three decades of doctrinal zigzag, the question of
whether corporations present special problems justifying specially
restrictive campaign finance laws is still not fully laid to rest.
Although Citizens United overruledAustin and the relevant portion of
McConnell, it left alone NR WC and Beaumont. Indeed, the Court
specifically distinguished NR WC as a contributions case that was of
"little relevance" to the question of limits on corporate spending. 2 7
Federal law flatly bans corporate contributions to federal candidates,
parties and political committees, and many states similarly bar
corporate contributions. Yet given that contributions enjoy some
constitutional protections-albeit less than expenditures-it is
difficult to see how a complete ban on corporate donations can be
sustained without some judicial endorsement of the view
emphatically disavowed in Citizens United that corporate campaign
participation presents no special dangers of corruption. It is not clear
if the absolute federal ban on corporate campaign contributionswhich is our oldest federal campaign finance law, dating back to
1907-will ultimately survive Citizens United. But if it does, then the
fundamental uncertainty at the heart of the Court's treatment of
campaign finance restrictions on corporations for the last third of a
century will remain. 28
Still, Citizens United did eliminate the Bellotti/Austin anomaly, and
if it stands-an uncertain proposition for an issue that has been
marked by a thirty-two year sequence of 5-4 (Bellotti), 3-6 (Austin),
4-5 (McConnell), and 5-4 (Citizens United) votes-it will clarify and
simplify the law governing corporate and union spending, and
27. Id. at 909.
28. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
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produce doctrine that is more internally coherent even if in greater
tension with the public's political preferences. But Citizens United's
resolution of the corporate spending issue only casts in sharper relief
the two central doctrinal difficulties that have beset campaign finance
law since the Court's seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo-the
contribution/expenditure distinction and the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction.
B. The Contribution/ExpenditureDistinction
The contribution/expenditure distinction has been at the heart of
American campaign finance jurisprudence since Buckley v. Valeo.
Buckley distinguished between expenditures-that is, spending by
candidates, parties, political committees and other organizations,
groups or individuals on communications to the voters (including
expenses preparing for such communications)-and contributionsthat is, payments made to a candidate, party, political committee or
other campaign actor that are then used to fund communications to
the voters (or to make a contribution to another campaign actor). The
Court found the two forms of campaign money differed in two ways:
the constitutional value of each activity, and the problem justifying
regulation that each activity may be said to generate.
Buckley treated expenditures as the highest form of campaign
speech and, consequently, gave them the greatest degree of
constitutional protection. The Court held that restrictions on
expenditures constitute "direct and substantial restraints on the
quantity of political speech," 29 and would thus be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny. Contributions, by contrast, were treated as a lower
order of speech. Unlike an expenditure, a contribution does not entail
an expression of political views: it "serves as a general expression of
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate
the underlying basis for the support." 30 Limiting the size of a
contribution places little burden on expression as "the quantity of
communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with
29. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
30. Id. at 21.
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the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." 3 ' As a result,
contribution restrictions would be subject to less strict review, and
would be upheld if "closely drawn" to advance "sufficiently
important" government interests. 32
Turning to the interests justifying regulation, Buckley found that
the government interest in preventing corruption and the appearance
of corruption justified contribution limits but not spending limits.
With contributions, particularly the prospect that "large contributions
are given to secure a potential quid pro quo from current and
potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative
democracy is undermined."
But a concern about corruption could not justify expenditure limits,
either on candidates or on expenditures by non-candidate individuals
or organizations supporting or opposing candidates for officespending that has come to be known as "independent expenditures."
A concern about corruption clearly failed to justify limits on a
candidate's use of his or her personal wealth: "[T]he use of personal
funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributions
and thereby counteracts the coercive pressures and attendant risks of
abuse" from potentially corrupting contributions. 34 Nor could
corruption justify limits on a candidate's total spending. Although the
absence of a spending limit increases the pressure on a candidate to
raise potentially corrupting contributions, including efforts to
circumvent contribution limitations, Buckley held that the
contribution restrictions adequately addressed that concern. More
controversially, Buckley also held the anti-corruption goal could not
justify limits on independent expenditures. Although large
independent spending supporting a candidate or advocating the defeat
of her opponent could, like a contribution, be helpful to a candidate
and thus serve as a source of "coercive influence," 35 Buckley simply
3 1.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id at 25; see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387-88 (2000).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 25.
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declared that such expenditures, as long as they were undertaken
without "prearrangement" or "coordination" with a candidate, posed
no corruption danger: "Unlike contributions, such independent
expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's
campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive." 36
The only conceivable government interest that could justify limits
on spending was political equality. Capping candidate expenditures
would reduce the inequality between the best- and worst-funded
candidates, and limits on independent spending would limit the
ability of the wealthy to have more influence over the election debate
than others. But the Court flatly declared that equality could not
justify spending limits: "[T]he concept that government may restrict
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others" was famously dismissed as "wholly foreign
to the First Amendment."37 Equality could not be used to justify
limits on a candidate's use of his personal wealth, his total campaign
spending, or expenditures by independent individuals and
organizations promoting or opposing candidates.
For more than three decades the contribution/expenditure
distinction has been central to the Court's campaign finance
jurisprudence, but it has proven highly problematic. The sharp
distinction between the two categories of campaign money makes
little sense in either theory or practice. On the one hand, the Court
has surely undervalued the constitutional significance of campaign
contributions. With the exception of personally wealthy candidates,
campaign contributions are a necessary prerequisite if a candidate is
to be able to undertake campaign expenditures. In the absence of
public funding or the provision of significant in-kind benefits like
free broadcast time to candidates, contributions are essential if
candidates are to obtain the money to be used for expenditures.
Contribution limits simply make it more difficult for candidates to
raise the money that will be converted into campaign expenditures.
Moreover, by permitting candidates to spend unlimited amounts but
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 48-49.
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requiring them to collect campaign funds in only limited sums, the
Buckley regime pushes candidates to devote enormous amounts of
time and effort to fund-raising. Indeed, fundraising ability itself
becomes a prerequisite to candidacy. The contribution/expenditure
distinction has also provided an enormous opening to political
intermediaries like political action committees (PACs) and bundlers
who can enable candidates to address the fundraising problem
inherent in a system based on unlimited spending and limited
donations. Where candidates need to spend large sums of money but
can raise contributions only in small amounts, the assistance provided
by PACs and bundlers can be vital, and a source of influence with the
candidates they aid.
So, too, campaign contributions are an important form of campaign
participation for many politically active people. Limiting
contributions limits this form of participation. Although Buckley
determined that from a constitutional perspective it is the fact of a
contribution, not its amount, that matters, as "the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing,"" that is
unpersuasive. A larger contribution says more-that the donor is
more supportive of a candidate-than a smaller donation by the same
donor to the same candidate. The intensity of a donor's support may
be of expressive significance. By the same token, not all expenditures
involve a direct communication from candidates or other political
organizations to voters. Expenditures can include office rent, staff
salaries, equipment purchases, and other administrative overhead, as
well as opposition research, opinion polling, and focus groups. These
may be crucial to a campaign, but are not the direct expression of
arguments or information captured by the Court's description of
campaign expenditures as pure speech.
Nor is it always easy to distinguish a contribution from an
expenditure. The majority in Buckley determined that a candidate's
use of his personal wealth in his own campaign ought to be treated as
an expenditure even though formally the candidate is contributing
money to the campaign. Justice Marshall, who joined all the other
38. Id. at 21.
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aspects of Buckley, dissented on this point.39 Several decades later,
Justice Breyer suggested that candidates' expenditures from personal
1940
funds "might be considered contributions to their own campaigns.
The more difficult line-drawing question has involved independent
expenditures. This also directly implicates the uncertainties built into
the one substantive justification for regulation the Court has
recognized: the prevention of corruption and the appearance of
corruption. The Court has recognized that expenditures coordinated
with a candidate's campaign present the same dangers of corruption
and the appearance of corruption as contributions and, accordingly,
has held they may be regulated like contributions. 4 1 However, the
Court has rejected the idea that independent expenditures that aid a
candidate and are just as likely to cause a candidate to feel obligated
to the spender as to the donor of a comparable amount of money to
the candidate's campaign can be limited. This has led to some bizarre
results. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
FEC, the Court held that spending by a political party in support of
its own senate candidate can be treated as independent-and thus not
subject to restriction.4 2 The lack of any formal coordination with the
candidate the party intended to aid was treated as of greater
constitutional significance than the ongoing relationship between a
party's candidates and the party. Political parties exist in large
measure to elect candidates who are party members, bear the party
label, and appear under the party's name on the ballot. But Buckley's
theory of independent expenditures led the Court to conclude that the
lack of party-candidate coordination of a specific ad meant that the
party had to be treated as an organization totally independent of its
candidates.
In McConnell v. FEC-acase in which the Court generally took a
pro-regulatory approach-the Court went even further in upholding
the concept that party spending undertaken independent of the party's
39. Id at 286-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-47; accord FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 442-43 (2001).
42. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,608 (1996).
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own candidates is independent spending in the Buckley sense and,
thus, protected from limitation. McConnell struck down a federal law
requiring that a party choose between coordinated and independent
expenditures once it has nominated a candidate.4 3 Whatever the
possibility of party independent spending in unusual circumstancesand in ColoradoRepublican the party's spending had occurred before
a nominee had been selected and consisted of criticism of the
candidate of the opposing party-surely it makes sense to conclude
that once a party has nominated a candidate and is coordinating its
general election activities with that candidate, it can no longer claim
to also be spending independently in support of the same candidate."
But the Buckley definition of independence, which focuses on the
coordination or prearrangement of the specific expenditure, led the
Court to come out the other way, thus confirming the politically
bizarre idea that a party can simultaneously coordinate with its own
candidate and spend independently of the same candidate.
of
the
aspect
problematic
most
Perhaps
the
contribution/expenditure distinction is the Court's increasingly
categorical determination that expenditures simply do not raise the
corruption and appearance of corruption concerns that justify
contribution regulation. In Buckley, the Court's holding that
corruption cannot justify restrictions on independent expenditures
was at least quasi-empirical in nature. The Court found only that
independent expenditures "may well provide little assistance to the
candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive." 4 5 in
Bellotti, even as it struck down a state ban on corporate spending in
ballot proposition elections, the Court acknowledged that "Congress
might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or
apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to
influence candidate elections."46 Similarly, when it struck down
limits on independent expenditures in support of or opposition to
presidential candidates who had accepted public funding in FEC v.
43. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 213-19 (2003).
44. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. at 613-14.
45. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
46. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).
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National Conservative PAC, the Court acknowledged that it is
"hypothetically possible . . . that candidates may take notice of and

reward those responsible for PAC [independent] expenditures by
giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting
messages," but concluded that on the record in the case "such an
exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a
hypothetical possibility and nothing more." 47
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,4 8 the Court actually
recognized that independent spending could be the functional
equivalent of a contribution, and just as corrupting as a contribution
of comparable size, when it held that a judge elected after an election
campaign in which he had been the beneficiary of millions of dollars
of independent expenditures was required by the constitution to
recuse himself from a case involving the independent spender. The
Court determined that given the amount of campaign assistance the
independent spending had provided, "there is a serious risk of actual
bias-based on objective and reasonable perceptions," in favor of the
independent spender in such a case. 4 9 Stunningly, Caperton
completely blurred the contribution/expenditure distinction that the
Court had spent thirty-three years developing and sustaining when it
repeatedly referred to the large independent expenditures in the case
as "contributions," 50 not independent expenditures. In Caperton,
functional reality finally overwhelmed the legal categories.
But in Citizens United, barely six months after Caperton,the Court
not only returned to the contribution/expenditure distinction but also
made it absolute. The Court acknowledged that "elected officials
[may] succumb to improper influences from independent
expenditures" and that if officials "surrender their best judgment; and
if they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for
concern." 1 But even that concern could not support limits on
independent expenditures. Citizens United declared independent
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985).
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
Id. at 2257, 2263.
Id. at 2263-65.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. CL 876, 911 (2010).
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spending limits unconstitutional under all circumstances, regardless
of the empirical evidence of their effects on the elected officials who
benefit from them.
Akin to the treatment of independent expenditures, the Court has
also experienced difficulty in determining what kinds of donative
transactions have sufficiently corruptive potential to be subject to
limitation. In Buckley, the Court stressed that corruption is not limited
to the kinds of quid pro quo deals already addressed by bribery laws.
Bribes, the Court observed, are only "the most blatant and specific
attempts of those with money to influence government action."52 in
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, the Court reemphasized that the
corruption concern is "not confined to bribery of public officials, but
extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors."5 3 In other cases, however, the Court
has stated that "[t]he hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro
quo: dollars for political favors." 54
The issue came to a head in McConnell v. FEC, when the Court
addressed Congress's restrictions on soft money contributions; that
is, donations by wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions that
were dramatically greater than the dollar limitations ordinarily
applicable to individual donations or that flatly violated the ban on
corporate and union donations to federal candidates and parties. The
conceptual basis for soft money's evasion of federal contribution
restrictions was that the donations did not go to specific candidates or
to parties for direct support of specific candidates, but were given to
the parties to finance party activities generally or to pay party
activities that aided candidates across the board, like voter
registration and get-out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising,
not specific candidates. In the absence of a direct relationship
between the donor and a specific candidate, defenders of the practice
contended that soft money did not raise an issue of corruption that
would justify restriction. A divided Court, however, found there was

52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28 (1976).
53. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
54. FEC v. Nat'1 Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
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substantial evidence that federal officeholders and candidates avidly
sought soft money and that major donors provided it "for the express
purpose of securing influence over federal officials."55 Although
there was little proof of specific situations in which donations directly
affected officeholder decisions, the Court emphasized that was not
necessary for a campaign practice to pose a corruption danger.
Congress could decide that the preferential access that large soft
money donations enabled special interest donors to obtain from
legislators was itself corruption.5 6
But in Citizens United the Court directly challenged its own prior
broad reading of corruption. Justice Kennedy, citing and quoting
extensively from his McConnell dissent which he cited as an opinion
and not a dissenting opinion, emphasized that "[t]he fact that
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does
not mean that these officials are corrupt" 57 and that concern about
undue influence cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a
basis for limiting a campaign finance practice "because it is
unbounded and susceptible to no limiting principle."58 Although a
consistent theme in Citizens United is that contributions are
categorically different from expenditures, the Court cited and quoted
language that would lead to a much more restrictive approach to
contribution limitations as well.
The contribution/expenditure distinction is thus both fundamental
and riddled with line-drawing issues and inconsistent treatment.
Many of the justices have realized this and in recent cases perhaps a
majority of the Court has hinted at a willingness to break with
Buckley's central holding. In 2006, in Randall v. Sorrell,59 Justices
Thomas and Scalia indicated in a concurring opinion that they would
subject contribution restrictions to strict judicial scrutiny, just like

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147 (2003).
Id. at 142-54.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. CL 876, 910 (2010).
Id. (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
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expenditure limits. 6 Justice Kennedy also voiced his "skepticism
regarding that system and its operation." 6 1 As Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion also concluded that the application of exacting
scrutiny to expenditure restrictions is "appropriate," 62 one can only
surmise that he would support closer review of contribution
restrictions, a position he had gestured at previously. 63 On the other
hand, Justices Stevens, 64 Souter, 65 and Ginsburg 66 in Randall
indicated they were willing to reconsider Buckley's ban on limits on
candidate spending. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, had
previously written to suggest that "it might prove possible to
reinterpret aspects of Buckley in light of the post-Buckley
experience ... making less absolute the contribution/expenditure
line, particularly in respect to independently wealthy candidates." 67
And in Citizens United, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, contended that "even technically
independent expenditures can be corrupting in much the same way as
direct contributions" and so could be regulated. 68
The contribution/expenditure distinction is not irrational. Indeed, it
can be seen as a plausible compromise that recognizes the First
Amendment value of campaign money while still enabling
governments to address some of the most problematic features of the
private-money-based campaign finance system. But it has proven
difficult to operate; has led to anomalous results, particularly the
concept of party independent spending; and has resulted in an
unrealistic, highly rigid distinction between contributions and
independent spending that fails to acknowledge that in reality the two
practices can have similar consequences. The distinction also relies
60. Id. at 266-67 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas had taken that position in several other
cases. See id. (noting cases in which Justice Thomas argued for applying strict scrutiny to contribution
restrictions).
61. Id. at 265 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 264.
63. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 405-10 (1999).
64. Randall, 548 U.S. at 273-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 281-84 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in his dissenting opinion. Id.
67. Nixon, 528 U.S. at 405.
68. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 967 (2010).
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heavily on a concept of "corruption" that is indeterminate in meaning
and has been marked by sharp swings in judicial interpretation. As a
result, the doctrinal development in this area has produced a body of
campaign finance law that even most members of the Court, as
individual justices, reject.
C. Express Advocacy and Issue Advocacy
The regulation of campaign money requires some means of
determining what constitutes campaign money, as opposed to nonelection-related political activity. This is less of a problem for
contributions to and spending by candidates, as candidate activity can
be treated as presumptively campaign-related (although there may be
some question as to whether or when a particular individual has
become a candidate for office). This is a much bigger issue for the
host of individuals, political committees, special interest
organizations, corporations, labor unions, and other groups that
engage in some mix of election-related activity, non-election-related
political activity, and even non-political activity. The application of
campaign disclosure laws requires some determination of which
contributions and expenditures are sufficiently election-related as to
be subject to disclosure. So, too, the application of contribution limits
requires some determination of whether a particular contribution is
given to election-related activity or other, non-election-related
political activity.
To be sure, drawing a line between elections and politics is, in
some sense, impossible. Elections are about political issues and ideas,
and political debate frequently is focused on and culminates in an
election. Election-related speech will typically refer to political
issues, and political speech will frequently refer to elected officials or
candidates for office. As Buckley put it, "[t]he distinction between
discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or
defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application." 69
Yet some distinction must be drawn between the two for campaign
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,42 (1976).
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finance law to work. In fact, Congress and state and local
governments regularly make that distinction when they define the
scope of their campaign finance regulations.
The Supreme Court, however, has deemed this, too, to be a matter
for judicial determination, and through the standard it initially
adopted in Buckley the Court has sharply narrowed the field of
constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulation. Buckley
held that only the express advocacy of "the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate for federal office" may be subject to
federal campaign finance regulation.7 0 In a footnote, the Court
indicated that this would "restrict" the scope of campaign finance law
to communications that included phrases like "'vote for,' 'elect,'
'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,'
'reject.'" 7 These became known as the "magic words" of express
advocacy. All other activity came to be known as "issue advocacy,"
even though it need not involve the discussion of issues. The Court
justified its standard as necessary to avoid both vagueness and
overbreadth,72 but in practice the standard proved extremely narrow,
effectively exempting a host of campaign messages from coverage.
The key concept in the Court's test was that the message include
literal words of express electoral advocacy. An advertisement could
warmly praise or sharply criticize a candidate for office, but so long
as it avoided literally calling on voters to elect or defeat that
candidate it would be treated as issue advocacy, not express
advocacy. Even discussion of a candidate's character, personality, or
private life was issue advocacy so long as there was no call to vote
for or against that candidate. To guarantee that an ad would be treated
as issue advocacy and not express advocacy, a political committee
could include a tag line urging the viewer or listener to call the
sponsor for more information, or to call the candidate depicted in the
ad and tell him or her what the caller thinks of the candidate's actions
or positions. As such advocacy was not electoral, the ad would not be

70. Id. at 44.
71. Id. at 44 n.52.
72. Id. at 44, 78-80.
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considered express advocacy. As a result, the express advocacy
standard proved extremely easy to evade. With most campaign
professionals recognizing that even many of the most successful
election ads by candidates relied on more subtle pitches than literally
calling on voters to vote a certain way, the express advocacy standard
assured that the vast majority of election ads placed by campaign
participants other than candidates would be exempt from campaign
finance regulation.
In McConnell v. FEC, the Court acknowledged the inadequacy of
the express advocacy test and upheld BCRA's provision extending
certain federal campaign laws-the prohibition on corporate and
union campaign expenditures and disclosure requirements-to a
newly defined category of "electioneering communications," which
consists of broadcast, cable, or satellite communications that refer to
a clearly identified candidate for federal office, are targeted on that
candidate's constituency, and are aired within thirty days before a
primary or sixty days before a general election in which that
candidate is running.74 The Court agreed that based on the evidence
before Congress and the record developed in the district court during
the litigation challenging the new law, "Buckley's magic-words
requirement is functionally meaningless," and that as a result,
"Buckley's express advocacy line ... has not aided the legislative
effort to combat real or apparent corruption." 75 The Court agreed that
the new standard avoided vagueness and was sufficiently narrowly
tailored to satisfy the overbreadth concern. Although the Court
acknowledged that some advertisements that met the statutory
standard might be true issue ads, it found that the "vast majority of
ads" covered by the statute had an "electioneering purpose" and were
thus the "functional equivalent of express advocacy" and could,
constitutionally, be subject to regulation.7 6

73. See generally Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 TEx.
L. REV. 1751 (1999).
74. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
75. Id. at 193-94.
76. Id. at 206.
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To be sure, the Court did not actually scrap the express advocacy
standard. Rather, all McConnell held was that the electioneering
communication provision was constitutional. Express advocacy
continued to be required as a prerequisite for regulation of
electioneering messages not falling within the electioneering
communications provisions, e.g., non-broadcast ads, or ads not aired
within the defined statutory pre-election period. Potentially, other
extensions of regulation might be permissible provided, like
"electioneering communication," they satisfied the Court's vagueness
and overbreadth concerns. But in the immediate aftermath of
McConnell there were two standards for defining electionrelatedness: "magic words" express advocacy as the general rule, and
electioneering communications for messages that met BCRA's
technology and timing requirements.
However, much of McConnell's incorporation of the reality of
campaign practices into the standard for defining election-relatedness
was undone four years later in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
("WRTL ").77 In WRTL, a closely divided and fragmented Court,
acting without a majority opinion, effectively eviscerated McConnell.
Although the case began as an attempt to create an as-applied
exception to the "electioneering communication" standard for an ad
that could be read as either electioneering or grass-roots lobbying
over a legislative issue, the Court effectively invalidated the statutory
standard. The Court found that although, consistent with McConnell,
the First Amendment does not require the literal "magic words"
express advocacy standard adopted in Buckley, it does forbid the
regulation of any campaign activity that is not the "functional
equivalent" of Buckley-style express advocacy. 78 In one stroke, the
Court, in Chief Justice Roberts's lead opinion, sharply narrowed the
scope of constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulation
while adopting a new standard that lacked the "magic words" express
advocacy standard's only virtue-clarity. The Chief Justice provided
two possible readings of the "functional equivalent" standard. On the
77. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).

78. Id.

910

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:4

one hand, he explained that an ad is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy "only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate" 79-which would expand the scope of coverage only a
little beyond the "magic words" express advocacy test. But then he
noted that the ads at issue in the case-which were held to be entitled
to a constitutional exemption from the electioneering communication
statute even though they referred to a candidate and were broadcast in
the defined pre-election period-"focus on a legislative issue, take a
position on the issue, . . . do not mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger; and ... do not take a position on a

candidate's character, qualifications, or fitness for office" 80-leaving
open the possibility that more "electoral" ads might be considered the
functional equivalent of express advocacy even if electioneering was
not the only "reasonable interpretation" that could be applied to the
ads.
Beyond the vagueness and uncertainty created by the WRTL
standard, the lead opinion also broke with McConnell's willingness to
give great weight to the proven impact of campaign practices in the
determination of legal standards. McConnell looked to the statements
of officeholders, candidates, interest group advocates, corporate
executives, campaign strategists, and political scientists in
determining that the intent, effect, and context of these ads mattered,
so that those factors ought to be included in determining how to
distinguish between electioneering and other political advertising.8 1
Chief Justice Roberts, however, dismissed these factors and focused
instead exclusively on the wording of the ad-on whether the ad used
the unmistakable language of electoral advocacy. 82
WRTL simultaneously complicated and narrowed the scope of
constitutionally permissible campaign finance regulation. The
"functional equivalent of express advocacy" test is vague, and must
coexist with the ordinary "magic words" express advocacy test that
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 469-70.
Id. at 470.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205-6(2003).
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 466-67,469-70 (2007).
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continues to apply to non-broadcast ads and to ads aired outside the
pre-election period. Like the "magic words" test, the standard will
exempt many ads that-if intent, effect, or context were consideredwould likely be treated as electioneering. Strikingly, WRTL did not
find that to be a problem. Indeed, foreshadowing Citizens United's
categorical protection of independent spending even if it could be
shown that such spending influences officeholders, the WRTL lead
opinion makes a point of stressing that it is based on constitutional
norms, not campaign realities. Moreover, the sharp shift from
McConnell to WRTL less than four years later underscores both the
marked instability of the Court's campaign finance doctrine and the
variability of its constitutional norms.

II. THE COURT'S NARROWING OF THE PERMISSIBLE PURPOSES OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION

The Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence is a mess. It
has been marked by sharp doctrinal swings-from Bellotti to Austin
to Citizens United on the regulation of corporations, and from
Buckley to McConnell to WRTL on the permissible scope of
regulation. It has led to odd results, such as the finding that parties
are capable of spending independent of their own candidates and that
such spending is constitutionally protected, but that parties can be
restricted when they cooperate with their own candidates. The Court
repeatedly tells us that the proper response to high levels of spending
is not limits but more spending. But then in Davis, when faced with a
law that would make it easier for a candidate facing a wealthy, highspending self-funded candidate to do just that by raising money in
larger amounts, the Court held that law unconstitutional. And,
perhaps most strikingly, the Court has insisted on the adoption and
enforcement of certain rules that fly in the face of campaign
realities-that independent spending is categorically different in its
lack of corruption danger from contributions, and that whether a

83. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
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statement ought to be treated as electioneering can be determined
entirely from its words without reference to its context.
To some extent, these problems in the Court's doctrine are not
surprising. Although the Court has assumed for itself the primary role
in articulating the constitutional constraints on campaign finance law,
the Constitution actually gives the Court relatively little guidance as
to how to resolve campaign finance issues. The Constitution gives
Congress the power to regulate the time, place, and manner of federal
elections; to guarantee a republican form of government to the states;
to prevent the states from denying their citizens the equal protection
of the laws; and, of course, it prohibits Congress and, through nearly
a century of interpretation, the states, from abridging the freedom of
speech. But none of these provisions clearly addresses whether and to
what extent Congress or a state or local legislature can regulate
campaign contributions and expenditures.
More fundamentally, campaign finance law implicates multiple
constitutional concerns including freedom of speech and association,
voter information, political equality, the integrity of the electoral
process, and the consequences of the campaign finance system for the
effectiveness and integrity of govermnent. These constitutional
concerns often come into conflict, but the Constitution does not
indicate how they are to be weighed and balanced against each other.
The conflicts are often deeply normative, such as the trade-off
between equality and free speech raised by the imposition of limits
on campaign money, or that between political participation and voter
information posed by disclosure rules. They also involve the
resolution of empirical questions, such as whether independent
spending has the same potential to influence government officials as
contributions of a comparable size, on whether-or at what monetary
level-limits on contributions and expenditures help or hinder
incumbents.
The Court has, to a considerable degree, assumed the authority to
resolve these questions. But it has done so largely by dismissing
outright certain values such as equality, or by narrowly defining the
role that other values, such as competitive elections and addressing
the impact of the campaign finance on governance, may play. In so
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doing it has not only sharply narrowed the goals campaign finance
law may be allowed to advance, but it has rejected the judgments of
elected officials or voters approving ballot propositions that those
other values matter and ought to be taken into account in the rules
that govern campaign contributions and spending. And it has done so
without a clear constitutional mandate that the Court's values are the
only ones that matter or that the political values rejected by the Court
do not.
The most important constitutional value the Court has rejected is,
of course, voter equality, which is a central premise of our
democratic system. Over the course of our history, the electorate has
been expanded from a relatively narrow set of white male property
owners or taxpayers to virtually all adult citizens. Modern
constitutional developments like the one person, one vote doctrine 84
and the anti-vote-dilution doctrine8 5 have sought to ensure not simply
that every adult citizen enjoys the right to vote but that each voter has
an equally weighted vote, and thus an equal opportunity to influence
the outcome of an election. Moreover, modern constitutional law
emphatically denies a special place for wealth in voting and elections.
Most states long ago scrapped wealth or tax-payment requirements
for voting, and the Court made the elimination of such wealth or taxpayment tests constitutionally mandatory. Wealth may not be a
criterion for the right to cast a ballot,86 or to be a candidate,8 7 nor may
the wealth of a voter be a factor in deciding how much weight a
particular vote may be given.
The role of voter equality in our electoral system has implications
beyond the actual casting and counting of ballots. For the election to
serve as a mechanism of democratic decision-making, there must be a
considerable amount of election-related activity before balloting can
occur. Candidates, parties, interest groups, and interested individuals
need to be able to attempt to persuade voters as to how to cast their
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
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ballots. The election campaign is an integral part of the process of
structured choice and democratic deliberation that constitutes an
election. The political equality norm that governs the right to vote,
the aggregation of votes into election districts, and the right to be a
candidate is relevant to the right of voters to present their choices to
the general electorate and to attempt to persuade the electorate to
support certain candidates or particular positions on ballot
propositions. Political equality is undermined when some individuals
or interest groups with greater private wealth than others can draw on
those resources to make more extensive appeals to the electorate than
can those with fewer resources. Indeed, a concern about the tension
between greatly unequal private wealth and political equality has
long been one of the driving forces behind campaign finance
regulation. It is, as Judge Guido Calabresi once put it, "the huge
elephant-and donkey-in the living room on all discussions of
campaign finance reform." 89
To be sure, the inequality resulting from the use of unequal private
wealth to pay for campaign activity is different from the inequality
resulting from wealth tests for voting or candidacy. In the voting and
candidacy situations, state laws used the lack of private wealth to
limit electoral participation, whereas in the campaign finance context
the unequal resources for participation are more broadly attributable
to the private economy, including its underlying social, political, and
legal framework, than to specific government decisions. So, too,
participation in and influence over an election campaign are not the
same as voting or becoming a candidate for office. It is relatively
easy to measure votes and to ensure that no person casts more votes
than any other. Participation and influence take many different forms,
vary widely in intensity, and are difficult to measure. It is virtually
impossible to quantify the impact of a particular dollar in a particular
race, much as it is also difficult to quantify other non-monetary
modes of participation and influence-endorsements by celebrities or
opinion leaders, the intensity of commitment of volunteers, the
89. Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (denial of petition
for rehearing en banc).
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superior organizational ability of certain interest groups-that can
affect a campaign. We can have universal adult citizen suffrage and
give each eligible voter an equally weighted vote, but it is not
possible to assure that each voter has the same opportunity to
influence the election debate. Or, put alternatively, the only way to
assure that each voter has an equal influence would be to prevent all
private campaign spending, which would surely be the case of the
"remedy that is worse than the disease." 90
Government did not cause private resource inequality, and
government cannot completely achieve campaign finance equality
either. But the constitutional value of political equality embodied in
the idea of equal protection of the laws and advanced in the political
realm by the notion of one person, one vote, surely provides support
for government efforts to ameliorate the electoral consequences of
economic inequality. Buckley famously and emphatically rejected the
idea that the advancement of political equality can justify spending
limits, declaring that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,"
but the Court provided absolutely no support for this position other
than by citing cases attesting to the value of political speech.91 The
Court observed that "[t]he First Amendment's protection against
governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made
to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public
discussion"92 -which seems at best orthogonal to the political
equality goal of limiting the possibility that a "person's financial
ability" will dominate "public discussion."
The only cases the Court discussed to support its claim that the
promotion of equality cannot justify spending limits were Mills v.
Alabama93 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.94 Tornillo,
which struck down a Florida law that had sought to require a
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 49 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hackett Publishing ed., 2005).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, at 48-49 (1976).
Id. at 49.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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newspaper to make space available for a political candidate to reply
to its criticism, seems completely inapposite as campaign finance
laws have never sought to require one candidate to make resources
available to an opponent, which is, in effect, what the Florida law
sought to do. Mills, which addressed a state law that barred a
newspaper from publishing an editorial on election day urging the
voters to vote a particular way on a ballot proposition, seems
marginally closer to the campaign spending limits issue, but even the
relevance of Mills seems stretched. The law in that case reflected
only a modest effort to prevent "confusive last-minute charges and
countercharges ... when as a practical matter, because of lack of
time, such matters cannot be answered or their truth determined until
after the election is over." 95 The Court quickly concluded that the law
was likely to be "wholly ineffective" in assuring adequate replies to
campaign charges as people remained "free to hurl their campaign
charges up to the last minute of the day before [the] election," 96 and
thus did not provide a reasonable basis for curtailing newspaper
editorials. The broader question of whether voter equality can justify
limitations on the use of private resources in campaigning was not
raised or addressed in either Mills or Tornillo.
As Justice Breyer has pointed out, Buckley's flat declaration that
"'the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others' . . . cannot be taken literally."97 As he explained, "[t]he

Constitution often permits restrictions on the speech of some in order
to prevent a few from drowning out the many-in Congress, for
example, where constitutionally protected debate, Art. I, § 6, is
limited to provide every Member an equal opportunity to express his
or her views. Or in elections, where the Constitution tolerates
numerous restrictions on ballot access, limiting the political rights of

95. Mills, 384 U.S. at 219-20 (quoting the opinion of the Alabama Supreme Court upholding the
law).
96. Id. at 220.
97. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting
Buckley at 48-49).
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some so as to make effective the political rights of the entire
electorate." 98
Indeed, prior to Buckley, spending limits were a long-established
part of American campaign finance law. As early as 1910, federal
law imposed limits on spending by candidates in federal elections;
these limits were carried forward by the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act of 1925, and supplemented by limits imposed on spending by
multistate political committees, labor unions, and corporations in the
1940s.99 Although typically evaded in practice, these limits remained
on the books until the overhaul of federal campaign finance in the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.100 Starting in the late
nineteenth century, the states also sought to limit campaign
expenditures. By 1932, thirty-nine states had laws limiting the size of
campaign expenditures.101 Again, the effectiveness of these laws was
uncertain. But the principle that states could limit expenditures was
well-established for more than a half-century before Buckley.
Moreover, the political equality concern certainly played a
significant role in the post-Buckley Court's endorsement of limits on
the use of corporate and union treasury funds in elections, most
prominently in Austin. In Austin's view, the unfairness of corporate
campaign spending was that a corporation's election funds "have
little or no correlation to the public's support for [its] ideas."l 02
Prohibiting corporations from using their treasury funds and limiting
them instead to the use of individual donations to corporate PACs
"ensures that expenditures reflect actual public support for the
political ideas espoused by corporations."o10 3 In other words, spending
that reflects the corporation's wealth rather than the extent of popular
support for its message gave the corporation an undue influence on
the electoral outcome. That is the voter equality concern in a nutshell.
Although Citizens United has disavowed Austin, the persistence of

98. Id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)).
99. 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1925), repealedby Act of Feb. 7, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 20.
100. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 11.
101. LOUISE OVERACKER, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 303 (Charles E. Merriam ed., 1932).
102. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
103. Id.
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the corporate and union spending limits for decades even after
Buckley demonstrates the underlying constitutional power of the
voter equality norm.
Political equality, in the sense of equality of voter influence, can be
invoked to support limits on the ability of wealthy individuals to
deploy significant financial resources in election campaigns. This
could support limits on independent spending and on the ability of
wealthy candidates to take advantage of their personal fortunes. But
political equality would not support limits on campaign spending
where the difference in candidate resources reflects differences in the
extent, and intensity, of support for the candidates. In other words,
voter equality is not affronted if one candidate has more resources
than her opponent simply because she has more, or more enthusiastic,
supporters.
There are, however, other constitutional values that could support
limits on candidate campaign expenditures. Professor Vincent Blasi
has pointed out that in the world without spending limits elected
officials are forced to devote enormous amounts of time to fundraising, thereby cutting into their ability to devote the necessary time
and attention to their public duties-"information gathering, political
and policy analysis, debating and compromising with [their] fellow
representatives, and the public dissemination of views., 104 In his
view, concern about the quality of the representation impaired by
endless fund-raising is a matter of constitutional magnitude, derived
from the norms of popular election and governance by elected
representatives embodied in Article I, the Seventeenth Amendment,
and the Republican Form of Government Clause. 05 In a sense, the
time-protection concern is akin to the anti-corruption concern that the
Court has endorsed. Both reflect a well-founded recognition that a
campaign finance process that entails the raising of large sums of
money in private contributions can have adverse consequences for
government decision-making, either by skewing it in the direction of
104. See Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-raising: Why Campaign
Spending Limits May Not Violate the FirstAmendment After All, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1282-83
(1994).
105. See id at 1283.
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major donors, or by denying elected officials the time they need to
analyze, understand, debate, and resolve critical public issues.
A number of lower-court judges have embraced this officeholder
time-protection concern as a possible justification for limits on
candidate spending.106 The Supreme Court, however, in Randall v.
Sorrell,107 summarily dismissed this concern. The plurality opinion
did not actually address the merits of the argument that the
constitutional interest in representative government could support
spending limits in order to protect representatives' time. Instead, the
opinion simply found that the argument had been implicitly rejected
in Buckley and was thus precluded by stare decisis.10 However, the
only discussion of the burdens of fund-raising in Buckley occurred in
the context of its affirmation of the presidential public funding
program, which ameliorated those burdens. Buckley never discussed
the time burdens of fund-raising or the constitutional value of
officeholder time protection in its analysis of spending limits. The
Court took the argument off the table without ever fully discussing it.
An additional concern implicated by campaign finance law that has
been given relatively short shrift by the Court is the value of
financially fair and competitive elections. Elections are about giving
voters choices. If one candidate has significantly more resources than
his or her opponents, that candidate can have an advantage in
campaigning and in getting his or her message to the voters. This can
affect campaign outcomes and, if the election campaign is seen as
financially unfair, it can undermine the legitimacy of the election in
the eyes of the voters. Indeed, it is commonplace to say that a
candidate who greatly outspends the opposition is attempting to
"buy" the election even if there is no evidence of literal vote-buying.
The concern about fair competition is particularly focused on the
willingness of political newcomers to enter the fray, on the ability of
challengers to effectively take on incumbents, and on the capacity of
106. See, e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 2004); Landell v. Sorrell, 382
F.3d 91, 122 (2d Cir. 2004); cf Kruse v. City of Cincinnati, 142 F.3d 907, 919-20 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Cohn, J., concurring).
107. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 245-46 (2006).
108. Id.
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non-wealthy candidates to compete against wealthy candidates who
self-fund their campaigns. In each of these situations, both the
appearance and the reality of fair election competition is promoted
when the difference in resources available to different candidates is
moderated. This is particularly important in contests between
challengers and incumbents. At the least, our system of representative
government is based on the requirement that elected officials be
required to defend their posts periodically, and that the people
exercise the ultimate control over their government by being able to
vote out current officeholders. As a practical matter, however, that
requires challengers who are able to run financially competitive
races. Yet incumbents typically enjoy many built-in electoral
advantages, ranging from the free media attention they get while in
office, to the opportunity to use the office to provide constituency
service, to the superior ability to raise campaign money, particularly
from individuals, organizations, and interests groups that have a
material stake in government action. While sometimes a candidate's
financial edge will reflect his or her popularity going into the
campaign season, the danger is that a substantial early advantage will
prevent a truly competitive race from ever getting started. One goal
of campaign finance regulation is to promote fair elections by
controlling the financial advantages that some candidates, particularly
incumbents, enjoy.
The concern to provide adequate resources to political newcomers,
challengers, and candidates of personally modest means is one of the
goals underlying public funding programs. It might also be an
appropriate basis for limits on candidate spending and on a
candidate's use of personal resources. Limits alone cannot
accomplish equality of campaign resources, as limits do nothing to
provide candidates with resources. So, too, public funding alone may
not accomplish equality either as long as candidates with substantial
private resources are free to spend above the level of public funds
provided. But even the mitigation of candidate resource inequality
may promote the constitutional value of fair and competitive
elections. Absolute funding parity is not essential for fair elections,
and a challenger can do well when he or she musters a critical mass
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of funds even if the incumbent spends more. Moreover, limits on just
how much money a candidate can spend may prompt new entrants,
relieved of the concern that the better-funded candidate will wildly
outpace them financially. Spending limits could, thus, advance the
goal of fair and competitive elections both by expanding the number
of candidates, and by limiting the financial advantage enjoyed by the
best funded.
The Court has given some attention to the concern about
competitive elections in the context of campaign contributions. In
upholding contribution limits, the Court has cautioned that the limits
may not be so low that they prevent challengers from raising enough
money to effectively challenge incumbents. 109 Indeed, in Randall, the
plurality opinion struck down a set of state limits that it found to be
so low as to present "constitutional risks to the democratic electoral
process ... by preventing challengers from mounting effective
campaigns against incumbent officeholders, thereby reducing
democratic accountability." 0 However, the Court has never
considered the implications of this "constitutional concern for
electoral accountability" for unlimited spending that may enable
incumbents to radically outspend their challengers.
Indeed, in Davis the Court struck down the federal law intended to
make it easier for candidates to raise money when running against
wealthy self-funding opponents."' The so-called Millionaires'
Amendment did not limit the amount of money wealthy candidates
could spend. Rather, all it did was make it easier for the non-wealthy
opponent to raise money, albeit only up to the point where she
achieved resource parity with the self-funding candidate. Rather than
recognize that the law sought to promote competitive elections
without limiting the right to spend, the Court struck the law down
because it found the measure aimed at the forbidden goal of
equalizing electoral opportunities. Davis has since been relied on by
lower courts to strike down provisions of state public funding laws

109. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
110. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248-49.
111. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
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that provide additional "fair fight" funds to publicly funded
candidates campaigning against opponents who are spending more
than the public funding ceiling.1 12 Thus, apart from Randall, the
value of financially fair and competitive elections has had little
traction in the Court and even in Randall it was relied on to strike
down a popularly supported regulation, not to support it.
Finally, as the discussion of the definition of corruption in Part II
indicates, even when the Court recognizes that a constitutional value
may be the basis for regulating campaign finance, the Court has at
times narrowed the role that value is allowed to play. Allowing
Congress or the states to legislate based on a broader notion of
corruption that recognizes the indirect influence that campaign
contributions and independent spending can have on officeholder
decisions will permit more regulation, while the Court's embrace of a
narrower definition focused on quid pro quo relationships between
particular donors and particular candidates will narrow the scope of
regulation. The Court has gone back and forth in its thinking about
corruption, although Citizens United strongly embraced the narrow
approach.
Strikingly, the Court has in one way or another recognized the
power of each of the campaign finance norms that it ultimately
rejected or dismissed. Austin was rooted in concern to protect the
political equality of voters from corporate war chests; Buckley cited
the value of "free[ing] candidates from the rigors of fundraising"l 3
when it upheld the constitutionality of the presidential public funding
system; the Randall plurality opinion, as just noted, relied heavily on
a concern about the impact of campaign finance law on electoral
competitiveness; McConnell embraced a broad definition of
corruption; and Caperton was premised on a concern about the
corrupting effects of independent expenditures. These norms are
112. See, e.g., Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2011); Green Party of Connecticut v.
Garfield, 616 F.3d 213 (2d Cir. 2010); contra McComish v. Brewer, 611 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'g
McComish v. Brewer, No. CV-08-1550-PHX-ROS, 2010 WL 2292213 (D.Ariz. Jan. 20, 2010). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in McComish sub nom, Arizona FreeEnterprise Club 's Freedom Club
Pac v. Bennett,and McComish v. Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 644 (2010). The Court heard oral argument on this
question on March 28, 2011; the case is sub judice as of the time of this writing.
113. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
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sufficiently central to thinking about the financing of elections in a
democratic society that they can be repressed but they cannot be
entirely denied. Nonetheless, for the most part the Court has
narrowed the field of constitutionally permissible bases for campaign
finance regulation, and it has done so without either a clear
constitutional directive or a fully reasoned analysis of why free
speech concerns ought to so utterly dominate the field and displace
all other values.
My argument here is not that the Court has necessarily struck the
"wrong" balance among these competing values as a matter of
campaign finance policy. Concepts like "voter equality,"
"competitive
elections,"
and "corruption"
are inevitably
indeterminate. Complete equality of voter influence on elections is
impossible to attain short of denying all voters any influence at all.
Elections can be considered competitive so long as minimal restraints
are placed on any one's ability to become a candidate and campaign;
the fact that one candidate has greater resources does not mean there
is no competition. The decisions of officeholders to favor certain
interests may simply reflect those officials' ideological views or the
views of their constituents or supporters, not corruption.
Moreover, pursuing any of these goals through limits on raising
and spending money is fraught with difficulty. Limiting campaign
money does ultimately limit campaign communication and,
potentially, voter information. A limits-based strategy can breed a
culture of evasion, and may in turn lead to further regulations
designed to prevent circumvention of the original limits. Limits
generate multiple complex practical questions such as whether and
how to price the value of Internet blog posts, or the nonmonetary
assistance provided by supporters. Moreover, because of the tensions
among these goals, limits can have perverse consequences. Limiting
campaign contributions to advance the goals of equality and anticorruption actually worsens the time burdens of fund-raising, while
capping contributions or spending at too low a level can impair
electoral competitiveness and voter information.
My point rather is that the Constitution provides the Court with no
clear directive for determining which values to prefer, how to define
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the scope of these values, or how to resolve the inevitable conflicts
among these values. The Court is making political judgments about
which values ought to count and what they ought to mean. These are
political judgments in the highest sense in that they involve a
determination of how competing concerns for free speech, political
equality, fair and competitive elections, and honest and effective
government ought to be balanced out and reflected in the laws that
define the structure of our democratic system. But they are also
political in the sense that the Court is not so much interpreting the
Constitution as imposing the value judgments of the justices in the
current majority. These may be reasonable judgments-they may
even be the "right" judgments-but it is not clear why these are the
Court's judgments to make. It has no greater constitutional authority
and no greater political legitimacy than Congress or state or local
legislatures in making the trade-offs and weighing and balancing the
respective roles of free speech, political participation, voter
information, competitive elections, voter equality, government
integrity, and elected official time-protection in determining
campaign finance law.
Moreover, the Court certainly lacks the deep understanding of how
campaign finance operates in practice-how money affects elections
and how the raising and spending of campaign money affect the
behavior of government and its ability to represent and respond to the
interest of the entire electorate-that is hard-wired into the
consciousness of elected officials. Today we have a Court in which
not a single justice ever ran for or held elective office. It is perhaps
not surprising that some of the justices most deferential to campaign
finance laws were either justices who had once held elective office
themselves, like Justice O'Connor, a co-author of McConnell, or who
had been involved in managing an election campaign, like Justice
White, the only dissenter from Buckley's invalidation of spending
limits. Campaign finance jurisprudence entails practical empirical
judgments that elected officials are clearly better equipped to make.
The Supreme Court dominates campaign finance law, but its
jurisprudence has failed both the more technical, craft-like rule of law
norms of coherence, consistency, and workability, as I have shown in
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Part I, as well as the more fundamental requirement that it provide a
sustained reasoned justification for its picking and choosing among
constitutional norms in a manner that sharply narrows the ability of
the people, acting through their elected representatives or by voter
initiative, to set policies that reflect the full range of concerns that
legitimately go into the design of a system for the financing of
democratic elections. The time has come to dejudicialize our
campaign finance law, that is, for the Court to reduce its own role by
giving greater deference to the value choices of politically
accountable decision-makers. The next Part will address one final
argument against judicial deference and then suggest how a
dejudicialized campaign finance doctrine might work.

III. DEJUDICIALIZING CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW
A. JudicialReview and Legislative Entrenchment
It could be argued that aggressive judicial policing of campaign
finance law is appropriate because of the danger that elected officials
will adopt laws that are self-serving, incumbent-protective, and
ruling-party entrenching. After all, campaign finance laws are
adopted by elected officials who have a stake in their own re-election
and who are certainly unlikely to have any interest in being fair to
potential challengers, the party out of power, political newcomers, or
other threats to the political status quo. Even if it is true that only
politicians can understand campaign finance well enough in practice
to produce workable campaign finance laws, it can also be argued
that campaign finance is too political to be left to the politicians.
Much as the Court's intervention in the political thicket of legislative
apportionment was justified by the ongoing unwillingness of elected
officials to change the rules under which they had been elected, the
Court's extensive intervention into campaign finance law can be
justified by a well-founded fear that incumbents will manipulate
campaign finance laws in their own interest-that campaign finance
regulation can be used as a kind of gerrymandering.
There are four problems with this argument. First, historically
relatively little campaign finance regulation reflects the efforts by the
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party in power to entrench itself. Raymond LaRaja's history of
federal campaign finance regulation"14 demonstrates that campaign
finance laws are usually enacted by cross-party coalitions, often
consisting of a minority faction of the party in power acting in
alliance with the party out-of-power. Thus, the first federal campaign
finance laws enacted in the period between 1907 and 1925-an era of
clear Republican dominance-were pushed through by the
Progressive minority within the Republican Party working with the
Democratic minority in Congress. These reforms were intended to
weaken, not strengthen, the leading party, and according to LaRaja
they succeeded."t 5 Similarly, the campaign laws adopted in the period
between 1939 and 1947 were pushed through by a combination of the
conservative minority within the Democratic Party and Republicans
and were aimed in large part at weakening the financial role of key
groups in the Democratic Party-public employees and unions. In
this largely Democratic era, Congress elected "Republican
reforms."1 16 More recently, BCRA's soft money limits were pushed
through by a minority of ideological activists in the Democratic
Party, notwithstanding the Democrats' greater dependence on soft
money, joined by a reform remnant in the Republican Party clearly
out of sync with the majority of the party. BCRA clearly was not
an effort by a dominant party to entrench itself as there was no truly
dominant party in Congress when BCRA was enacted in 2001-02.
Democrats held the narrowest possible majority in the Senate, while
Republicans controlled the House and the Presidency. Only the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the FECA Amendments
of 1974 can be seen as the product of a clear one-party (Democratic)
Congressional majority, but even then that majority was not vetoproof and so had to accommodate the concerns of a Republican

114. RAYMOND J. LARAJA, SMALL CHANGE: MONEY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

REFORM (2008).
115. Id. at 45-56.
116. Id. at 56-65.
117. Id. at l06-18.
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president,11 8 and both measures received considerable Republican
support. 1 9
Second, it is not at all clear that restrictive campaign finance laws
will operate to entrench parties in power. Other countries that have
enacted spending limits have witnessed major swings in political
control. Canada, for example, limits party campaign spending,
independent spending, and spending on broadcast advertising in
elections for its federal Parliament. Yet, in the 1993 parliamentary
election the dominant Progressive Conservative Party, which entered
the election with 169 seats (out of 295), came out of it with just 2
seats, while the previously out-of-power Liberals went from 83 seats
to 177 and the brand new Reform Party won 52 seats. Reform
eventually merged with the Progressive Conservatives to become the
Conservative Party, which garnered 99 seats (out of 308) in 2000,
and 124 and control of the government in 2006, while the seats held
by the Liberals, who governed from 1993 through 2006, shrank from
172 (in 2000) to 135 (in 2004) to 103 (in 2006) to 77 (in 2008).120
Spending limits did not lock the Progressive Conservatives into
power in 1993, nor did it lock them out of power even after they had
fallen to just two seats, much as the limits did not prevent the
Liberals from winning in 1993 or prevent them from falling out of
power in 2006.
Third, it is far from clear that campaign finance laws are more
advantageous to incumbents than no laws at all. Incumbents have
built-in advantages in raising money. They can provide benefits to
individuals and interests who have a stake in government action.
Moreover, given the likelihood that most incumbents will be
reelected, those who do business with government have an incentive
to donate to incumbents. In the absence of contribution and
expenditure limits, incumbents would most likely raise more money
and spend more money than their challengers in most elections.
Financially, incumbents as a group would almost surely be better off
118. Id. at 72-75.
119. Id. at 104.
120. Wikepdia.org,
List
of
Canadian
Federal
General
Elections,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilList-ofCanadian federalgeneral elections (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
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with less rather than more regulation-although, to be sure,
regulations can also serve to help incumbents.
Finally, it does not seem that concern about incumbency protection
explains the Court's campaign finance decisions. The Court has never
provided different constitutional treatment to laws adopted by voter
initiative as opposed to those enacted by legislatures, yet surely the
former measures are very unlikely to be intended to entrench
incumbents. The campaign finance regime that the Court's decisions
have produced seems particularly likely to benefit incumbents, since
incumbents are best positioned to utilize the PACs, bundlers, and
other political intermediaries necessary to collect the large number of
dollar-limited contributions needed to finance the unlimited spending
the Court permits and many candidates think that the imperatives of
politics require. Indeed, PACs have consistently favored incumbents,
as well as the party in power or the party thought likely to win the
next election, in their campaign donations. Finally, although
members of the Court have occasionally criticized certain regulations
as likely to be incumbent-protective, the only case where the
incumbent-protection concern played a role in a decision was in the
three-justice plurality opinion in Randall.121
Incumbency-entrenchment is a plausible justification for
aggressive judicial review of campaign finance law in theory, but it
does not hold up that well in practice. At the state and local levels,
many campaign finance laws have been adopted by voter initiative,
and even federal laws have often been the result of complex
coalitions rather than self-serving efforts by the party in power.
Electoral results from other countries indicate that restrictive
campaign finance laws do not bar dramatic political turnarounds. Nor
is there any reason to believe that incumbents are better off with
campaign laws than without them.
Most importantly, concern about incumbency protection does not
require the rigid, categorical approach the Court has taken to certain
campaign finance laws, such as spending limits for candidates or
independent committees or special attention to the needs of the
121. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249(2006).
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opponents of wealthy self-funding candidates. Challenger interests
can be vindicated by a close review of the details of particular laws in
the relevant political context, rather than by per se rules. That, in fact,
has been the approach the Court has taken to the potentially
incumbent-protective effects of contribution limits. Such limits are
generally constitutional, but will be struck down if so low as to
preclude effective competition. The Court has taken a similar stance
in considering reporting and disclosure requirements. Disclosure is
generally constitutional, but may be invalidated in circumstances
where public disclosure of contributions or expenditures exposes
vulnerable individuals or groups to threats, harassment, or reprisal.122
As I will indicate in the next section, this combination of general
support for regulations aimed at advancing a broad range of
legitimate campaign finance goals-including political equality,
competitive elections, and government integrity and effectivenesswith closer consideration of the consequences for challengers or
minorities in discrete cases, ought to be the approach the Court takes
to campaign finance law generally.
B. A New Modelfor JudicialReview of CampaignFinanceLaw
Campaign finance law ought to be dejudicialized. By that I do not
mean that it ought to be deconstitutionalized. Campaign finance law
has broad implications for a host of constitutional concerns-freedom
of expression and association, the right to vote, fair electoral
competition, honest government-so that constitutional review is
entirely appropriate, indeed, necessary. But it ought to be
dejudicialized to the extent that courts play a lesser role in
determining both the permissible goals of campaign finance law and
the proper regulatory techniques. The determination of the values that
ought to go into the financing of democratic elections; the weighing
and balancing of competing concerns; the fitting of campaign finance
rules to particular political needs, settings, and practices-these are
122. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); see also Doe v.
Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 197-200
(1999).
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primarily political decisions that ought to be left to the politically
accountable branches of government. The courts should continue to
review specific laws in context to see if they are intended to, or likely
to, benefit incumbent officeholders or parties, and they should also
strike down laws that are aimed at or unduly burden particular
political viewpoints, minority political groups, or adherents to
unpopular causes. Courts would, in effect, police the outer bounds of
regulation, but they would have to stick to the outer bounds.
There are models for this approach in our election law
jurisprudence. A good example is the Court's treatment of the state
rules that limit the ability of third parties and independents to win
places on the ballot. In Williams v. Rhodes,12 3 the Court held that
such laws burden two different, but overlapping, constitutional rights:
"the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively." 24 The Court then
invalidated laws that raised such high hurdles to ballot access that
new parties and independents were effectively barred from competing
and the two major parties were given "a permanent monopoly on the
right to have people vote for or against them." 25 However, in
subsequent decades the Court upheld a host of restrictive ballot
access rules, including significant signature requirements,' 26 antisore-loser rules precluding primary election losers from running as
independents in a general election,127 laws barring the counting of
write-in ballots,12 8 and anti-fusion laws that have the effect of barring
minor parties from nominating the candidates of a major party. 129In
so doing, the Court has emphasized the positive value of state laws
that regulate elections, including those that limit electoral choices:

123. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
124. Id. at 30.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
127. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728 (1974); see also Am. Party of Tx. v. White, 415 U.S. 767,
772 (1974) (upholding a law disqualifying a voter who had voted in a primary from signing a petition
qualifying an independent to run in the general election).
128. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992).
129. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 354 (1997).
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Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the
conclusion that government must play an active role in
structuring elections; 'as a practical matter, there must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest
and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
-130
democratic process.
Strikingly, the Court has held that states "have a strong interest in
the stability of their political systems"'31 and may adopt rules that
control against "party splintering and excessive factionalism" and
promote "a healthy two-party system."l 32
In effect the Court has concluded that a wide range of political
choices go into the design of an electoral system, including
representation of minority viewpoints, flexibility and openness to
political change, the rights of voters to offer and receive a range of
electoral options, but also political stability based on protecting the
existing party structure and favoring a two-party over a multi-party
system. Weighing and balancing these competing political values is a
matter for state political decisions, with the balance struck differently
in different states. The Court's rules prevent total entrenchment of the
two major parties but otherwise let the state political processes work
out varying combinations of openness and stability, which are
inevitably political. The Court has limited its own role largely to
policing only against "unreasonably exclusionary restrictions,",1 33 not
exclusionary restrictions per se. Indeed, the only per se rule that the
Court appears to be applying in the ballot access context is a ban on
filing fees,' 34 which the Court has treated as a wealth test inconsistent
with the constitutional norm of political equality.
A second instance of the Court letting states balance competing
political considerations in the framing of election laws, subject to a
judicially-enforceable outer bound, may be partisan gerrymandering.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 366.
Id. at 367.
Id.
Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149(1972).
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In Davis v. Bandemer,135 the Supreme Court held that partisan
gerrymandering presents a justiciable constitutional question.
Gerrymandering, the Court indicated, can deny an identifiable
political group "the same chance to elect representatives of its choice
as any other political group."136 The Bandemer majority, however,
fragmented over the question of how to determine what constitutes
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, with the plurality opinion
setting a very high bar for proving that a particular apportionment
scheme amounted to unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.
Indeed, in the two decades after the decision, nearly all assertions that
particular districting plans imposed unconstitutional partisan
gerrymanders were rejected.'"' In Vieth v. Jubelirer,the Court came
close to disavowing the justiciability of claims of unconstitutional
gerrymandering, but Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote to keep
the possibility of judicial oversight of partisan districting schemes
alive. Acknowledging that due to the lack of a single set of "agreed
upon substantive principles of fairness in districting,"l13 8 the Court
was unable to define "clear, manageable, and politically neutral
standards"' 39 for resolving gerrymandering claims. Given the
multiple, legitimate competing criteria that could be taken into
account in developing a districting plan, it was difficult for the Court
to determine whether particular plans are unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy-and ultimately the Court as a
whole-left open the possibility of judicial review to protect "rights
of fair and effective representation" 40 in the most egregious cases.
Vieth, like Bandemer before it, leaves the role of partisan concerns in
legislative districting largely to the political process, but with a hint
of a constitutional big stick in reserve in case of extreme partisan
abuse.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986).
Id.at 124.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80 & nn.5-6 (2004).
Id.at 307.
Id.at 307-08.
Id. at 312.
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As I previously indicated, the Court's treatment of contribution
restrictions and disclosure requirements already follows this model of
giving political decision-makers considerable discretion to determine
regulatory goals and techniques in general while reviewing specific
claims that under certain circumstances ordinarily acceptable rules
have unduly burdensome consequences for challengers or political
minorities. This model should be expanded to deal with campaign
finance regulation as a whole.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court should step back from the dominant role it has
undertaken in overseeing American campaign finance law. At
bottom, this is because there is no one, clear constitutional norm
driving campaign finance regulation. Rather, the law in this area
involves the reconciliation of multiple, and at times conflicting,
constitutional values. There is no reason to believe that the Court is
any better at weighing and balancing these values than politically
accountable decision-makers, and the record over the last thirty-five
years demonstrates the Court's failure to develop a consistent,
coherent, and workable jurisprudence that respects all the political
values at stake in the regulation of the financing of democratic
elections. There are no obvious right answers in campaign financeno one clearly correct way of combining freedom of speech and
association, voter information, political equality, competitive
elections, government integrity and effectiveness, and political
administrability. Dejudicializing campaign finance law would, at the
very least, facilitate the kind of variation, according to local
preferences and circumstances, and experimentation at the local and
state levels that could enhance our understanding of how campaign
finance law works in practice. So, too, it would reflect the inevitably
political nature of campaign finance decision-making while still
providing an outer bound of protection of constitutional rights.

